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Mutiny in Côte d’Ivoire 
Rebecca Schiel, Christopher Faulkner, and Jonathan Powell 
Abstract: Since 1990, Côte d’Ivoire has experienced over a dozen army 
mutinies, with three major events occurring in the first half of 2017. This 
paper explores the underlying causes of these events, considering both this 
year’s mutinies and the state’s prior experiences with military insubordina-
tion. A review of the events of Côte d’Ivoire’s tumultuous 2017 indicates a 
number of parallels with some of its earlier mutinies, though these more 
recent events are perhaps unique due to the presence of a larger range of 
dynamics and the scale of the mutineers’ demands. Beyond requests for 
better pay, which are nearly ubiquitous, these events also illustrate the 
general hazards of post-conflict civil–military relations, including chal-
lenges related to demobilisation, integration of rebel forces, the conse-
quences of soldiers having contributed to a leader’s ascendance, and the 
perils of soldier loyalties lying with personalities instead of the state. 
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On 6 January 2017, Ivorian soldiers in Bouaké launched a mutiny that 
quickly spread to as many as nine cities, including the commercial capital 
Abidjan, and resulted in the brief kidnapping of the defence minister.1 
The majority of mutineers were former rebels, integrated into the army 
after the Second Ivorian Civil War, in which they helped drive Laurent 
Gbagbo from power. The demands of the soldiers were varied, though 
financial considerations would become the primary emphasis. The gov-
ernment’s quick concessions alleviated concerns that the mutiny might 
escalate into more large-scale violence in the short term. However, by 
February other soldiers had followed this precedent in an effort to secure 
similar payouts. This effort stalled, but the original mutineers launched 
another revolt in May following the government’s attempt to backtrack 
on the terms of the January agreement. 
The mutinies of 2017 have led many to question the stability of 
Ouattara’s regime. Several characteristics of the recent events offer some 
areas for concern. First, the mutinies highlight common problems that 
accompany the integration of armed forces in post-conflict environments, 
problems that could make conflict recurrence more likely (Krebs and 
Licklider 2015). Second, mutinies occasionally escalate into coups d’état, as 
seen previously in Côte d’Ivoire (1999) and more recently in neighbouring 
Mali (2012) (Whitehouse 2012). Finally, the United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was scheduled to end on 30 June 2017, suggesting 
a potentially stabilising influence would soon depart.
In this paper, we contextualise the 2017 mutinies by briefly review-
ing Côte d’Ivoire’s civil–military history. We begin with a general over-
view of mutinies prior to 2017. We then explore the events of 2017, 
giving an overview of the actions and demands of the mutineers, and we 
review the regime’s response, while assessing commonalities with and 
departures from prior acts of military insubordination. 
Prior Mutinies in Côte d’Ivoire  
As is the case elsewhere, mutinies in Côte d’Ivoire have consistently been 
dominated by grievances related to compensation.2 The country’s expe-
1  For this paper, we follow the lead of Rose (1982: 561) and Dwyer (2015: 7) in 
defining mutiny as “an act of collective insubordination, in which troops revolt 
against lawfully constituted authority.” 
2  The description of events in this section is based on the following news re-
ports: Agence France Presse, “One Killed in Ivory Coast as Soldiers Mutiny,” 
29 March 2000; Associated Press, “Ivory Coast Rebels Start to Disarm,” 4 May 
2008; Associated Press, “Military Strikes a Deal with Mutinous Soldiers in Ivory 
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rience with mutiny began on 14 May 1990, when a group of conscripts 
attempted to take over the national radio station in Abidjan. The effort 
was quickly quelled, but a second mutiny two days later proved more seri-
ous: 900 soldiers took control of the international airport in Abidjan. 
March of 1993 saw more than 40 members of the Republican Guard oc-
cupy the presidential palace and take three officers hostage. Demands 
included the ubiquitous request for better pay, improved living conditions, 
and other general benefits, and the mutinies ended after direct – and fa-
vourable – involvement from President Houphouët-Boigny (Cornwell 
2000; Daddieh 2001; Fauré 1993). 
The consequences of mutinies would grow more serious over time. 
On 23 December 1999, soldiers took to the streets of Abidjan and seized 
control of key communication installations (Toungara 2001). Grievances 
again centred on salaries, including from disgruntled peacekeepers recently 
returned from the Central African Republic. President Henri Konan Bédié 
also faced widespread popular dissatisfaction, largely owing to his Ivoirité 
policy and the associated disenfranchisement of many Ivorians. Set against 
this backdrop of ethnic politics and increasing violence, Robert Guéï was 
able to seize the moment, and power, on 24 December 1999. 
Initial reactions within the army were positive, but the mutiny-
turned-coup of 1999 was merely a precursor to worsening events. March 
2000 witnessed a small mutiny at Daloa barracks. July 2000 saw a more 
widespread mutiny begin in Abidjan and spread to Bouaké. Soldiers 
seized the radio station and demanded wage arrears, in addition to pay-
ment both for peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and for their participation bringing Guéï to power. On 6 July, the sol-
diers agreed to return to their barracks upon receiving payouts of the 
equivalent of USD 1,600 – a small percentage of their initial USD 9,000 
request.  
Guéï’s rule proved to be short-lived. Despite surviving a coup at-
tempt in September 2000, he fled the country the following month in the 
face of sustained and growing popular protests against his interference in 
                                                                                                    
Coast,” 5 July 2000; BBC Monitoring Africa, “Côte d’Ivoire Funds Released to 
Pay Demobilized Soldiers in Bouaké,” 21 June 2008; BBC Monitoring Africa, 
“Côte d’Ivoire: Soro Advised to Deal with New Forces Protesting Unkept 
Promises,” 21 August 2008; L’Intelligent, “Quand Ouattara défendait la cause 
des mutins,” 22 May 2017; Reuters, “Ivory Coast Army Protests Sow Fears of 
Return to Unrest,” 30 November 2014; UN Integrated Regional Information 
Networks, “Côte d’Ivoire: Ex-Rebel Uprising Threatens Disarmament Process,” 
19 June 2008; UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, “Ivory Coast: Shooting 
Breaks Out in Commercial Capital,” 23 December 1999.  
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the presidential election that he had clearly lost (Akindès 2004). Laurent 
Gbagbo was installed and refused to submit to new elections based on 
more inclusive guidelines, including allowing Alassane Ouattara to be a 
candidate (Bah 2010). Another transition did not solve the army’s prob-
lems, as President Gbagbo soon faced a series of coup attempts and 
plots by Guéï loyalists, sympathisers of his rival Ouattara (Daddieh 
2001). On 19 September 2002 soldiers began protesting their demobili-
sation, which they assumed to be ethnically motivated. The movement 
quickly escalated into rebellion, and the abortive coup would serve as the 
opening salvo in the First Ivorian Civil War (El-Khawas and Anyu 2014). 
Problems related to integration of forces, payment of soldiers, and 
demobilisation allowances plagued the army following the war. The 
Ouagadougou peace agreement stipulated a 2 May 2008 deadline to 
begin disarmament of the Forces Nouvelles (FN). The process entailed 
26,000 soldiers being expected to reintegrate into civilian life, while an-
other 17,000 were to be integrated into the national army. The disarma-
ment process was, as many disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegra-
tion (DDR) programmes are, riddled with difficulties. On both 16 and 
18 June 2008, ex-rebels rampaged through Bouaké, demanding the de-
mobilisation payments (USD 210 per month for three months) that they 
had been promised by the new government. By 21 June, Le Patriote re-
ported that disbursement of three months’ worth of salaries for thou-
sands of former rebels had begun, and the soldiers returned to their 
cantonments. Another mutiny was reported by L’Inter on 18 August, in 
which ex-rebel forces blocked roads in Bouaké and briefly seized the FN 
command centre. The protest was brief, with soldiers quickly involved in 
talks with their commanding officers regarding better payouts for ser-
vice. Daloa, Daoukro, and Yamoussoukro saw similar efforts the next 
month. Soldiers returned to their barracks only when Guillaume Soro, 
then prime minister, assured them that payments were en route. 
The issues plaguing the military were far from solved. Little pro-
gress had been made with the demobilisation of the FN, and the im-
portance of retaining loyal soldiers was soon demonstrated. President 
Gbagbo’s infamous effort to annul his 2010 electoral loss launched the 
Second Ivorian Civil War, during which veterans and new recruits to the 
FN would prove instrumental in driving Gbagbo from power. Problems 
with demobilisation would persist. The failure to integrate the security 
sector in Côte d’Ivoire and Ouattara’s reliance on former FN members 
to seize power would prove costly.  
On 18 November 2014 Côte d’Ivoire experienced its first major mu-
tiny following the Second Ivorian Civil War. Again undertaken by former 
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FN personnel, the effort quickly spread. Demands were varied, including 
arrears from 2009 to 2011, faster promotions, improved subsistence allow-
ances, housing, and retroactive payments that would provide Ouattara 
loyalists with the same pay as international elements of the intervention by 
the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG). Notable was an attitude that the soldiers’ role in pushing 
Gbagbo from power had incurred a debt owed by Ouattara. These feelings 
among soldiers appear to be a recurring theme. Similar complaints were 
raised by mutineers against Guéï, as well as by Ouattara’s critics in 2017, 
who questioned the use of taxpayer money to buy off “bandits” (N’zi 
2017). By 19 November 2014, soldiers had returned to their barracks with 
government promises to disburse pay in two installments, the first in late 
November and the second in December of 2014. Ouattara’s overtures 
included efforts to signal a long loyalty to the military, even pointing to the 
role he had played in providing improved benefits to the armed forces as 
far back as the 1990 mutiny. The government swiftly negotiated a resolu-
tion, but the peace – again – would not last. 
Rewarding Insubordination?
The 2017 mutinies began with heavy gunfire in Bouaké in the early 
morning hours of 6 January 2017.3 Soldiers broke into an armory, seized 
3  The description of events in this section is based on the following news re-
ports: Afrique sur, “Déclaration du Pr Stéphane Kipré relative à la situation mil-
itaire et sociale en Côte d’Ivoire,” 20 January 2017; Agence France Presse, “Côte 
d’Ivoire: Des militaires mutins contrôlent Bouaké malgré l’appel au calme du 
Gouvernement,” 6 January 2017; Al Jazeera, “Behind Ivory Coast’s Army Mu-
tiny,” 8 January 2017; Al Jazeera, “Ivory Coast Soldiers Stage Fresh Revolt over 
Pay,” 12 May 2017; Associated Press International, “Ivory Coast Seeks End to Un-
rest as Gunfire Cuts off Port,” 18 January 2017; BBC Monitoring Africa, “Calm 
Returns to Ivorian Town of Adiake after Soldiers Mutiny,” 8 February 2017; 
BBC Monitoring Africa, “Ivorian Cabinet Condemns Army Mutiny in Southeast 
Town of Adiaké,” 10 February 2017; Cameroon Voice, “Mutinerie en Côte 
d’Ivoire: Ceux qui ont renoncé aux primes n’ont pas parlé au nom des mutins,” 
15 May 2017; Ivorian.net, “Côte d’Ivoire: La république abonnée à la mutinerie,” 
11 January 2017; Koaci, “Mutinerie: Gendarmes et policiers délogés, Daoukro 
dans la danse,” 6 January 2017; Koaci, “Mutinerie à Yamoussoukro, deux 
militaries abattus devant la,” 17 January 2017; Koaci, “Côte d’Ivoire: Mutinerie, 
de nouveaux tirs entendus à Adiaké nouvelle panique dans la ville,” 8 February 
2017; L’Intelligent, “Ce n’est pas Soro qui tire les 1celles oudécryptage d’une 
mutinerie,” 17 May 2017; Radio France Internationale, “Côte d’Ivoire: Les mutins 
demandent un geste au gouvernement,” 8 February 2017; Reuters, “Demobilized 
Rebels Block Road to Ivory Coast’s Second City,” 8 May 2017.  
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local police stations, and shut down roads into the city. The soldiers, the 
majority of them veterans of the 2014 mutiny, demanded bonuses, pro-
motions, increased wages, and improved living conditions. Within hours, 
soldiers in Daloa and Korhogo had also taken to the streets, and within a 
day soldiers were mutinying in as many as nine cities, including Abidjan. 
The two-day mutiny ended on 8 January as the mutineers and government 
reached an agreement that would see 8,500 soldiers each paid around XOF 
12 million (approximately USD 19,000) in two separate installments, the 
first of which was slated to be disbursed on 9 January. Within weeks, the 
government began disbursing payments of XOF 5 million (approximately 
USD 8,000), with the remaining XOF 7 million to be distributed by the 
end of May.  
The government was able to avoid the mutiny escalating to wider 
hostilities, but the “solution” was costly, amounting to between USD 
150 and 160 million. The announced payout, however, did not bring 
stability. First, former soldiers protested their exclusion from the deal 
struck in Yamoussoukro on 17 January; at least two were killed in the 
dispute. Second, a larger mutiny commenced on 7 February. Embold-
ened by the January mutineers, angered by pay discrepancies, and frus-
trated by their exclusion from the negotiated agreement, members of the 
Forces Spéciales revolted in Adiaké. Radiodiffusion-Télévision Ivoir-
ienne (RTI) reported these soldiers were paid a mere USD 80 of their 
USD 400 monthly salary. The soldiers vied for a similar deal to the Janu-
ary settlement but were quickly rebuffed. Information Minister Bruno 
Nabagne Koné, for example, remarked,  
The government deplores and condemns the events in Adiaké and 
all forms of violent demands because of the collateral risks that 
they make the civilian populations run and their negative effects 
on the economic activities. (BBC Monitoring Africa 2017a)  
On 8 February, the government announced that it would open talks but 
maintained a strict tone of disapproval. Five days later, Chief of Defence 
Staff General Touré Sékou announced that the special forces “acknowl-
edged that they displayed an attitude which was against the rules of their 
profession […and] expressed regret and apologized to the nation,” and 
requested to be pardoned for their error amidst the government’s prom-
ise to “take care of them” (BBC Monitoring Africa 2017a, 2017b). 
On 8 May, several hundred demobilised rebels blocked roads and 
demanded that they be paid bonuses promised upon demobilisation, in 
addition to demanding jobs in the army and other state institutions. The 
mutineers’ spokesman claimed that these protestors were representative of 
nearly 7,000 demobilised soldiers across the country; the protestors re-
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turned to their barracks within a few hours of receiving promises from 
local government officials that Ouattara would meet with their leaders. 
Only a few days later, on 12 May, shots rang out from military outposts in 
Abidjan, Bondoukou, Bouaké, and Korhogo as active-duty soldiers 
launched the third mutiny in five months. Mutineer spokesman Sergeant 
Fofana had issued an apology to the president on national television the 
day prior, absolving the government of its promise to disburse the second 
round of payments of the January agreement, saying, “Given such sacri-
fices granted to us during this difficult time, we, soldiers [...] definitively 
renounce all financial demands” (Bavier 2017). The announcement an-
gered many of the mutineers, who responded by blocking roads in 
Bouaké, firing guns into the air, and demanding the government follow 
through on the agreement. By 15 May, Defence Minister Alain-Richard 
Donwahi announced an agreement, and the following day clarified that the 
remaining balance of XOF 7 million would be allocated. XOF 5 million 
was to be distributed immediately to the 8,400 soldiers, with the remaining 
2 million to be paid at the end of June. 
Comparative Perspective
Comparing recent mutinies with historical examples offers insight into 
the recurring nature of these events. By examining the themes present in 
both recent and historical cases, including pay grievances and expecta-
tions of loyalty, we are able to see these events in a larger perspective.4 
First, beyond the financial matters that will be assessed below, both 
the January and May mutinies of 2017 were related to perceived slights 
of loyalty. Though their demands centred on payment arrears and bo-
nuses dating as far back as the 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement, the muti-
4  The description of events in this section is based on the following news reports: 
Agence France Presse, “Côte d’Ivoire: Des militaires mutins contrôlent Bouaké mal-
gré l’appel au calme du Gouvernement,” 6 January 2017; Associated Press, “Military 
Strikes a Deal with Mutinous Soldiers in Ivory Coast,” 5 July 2000; Connection 
Ivoirienne, “Accord Ouattara / Mutins / Le parti de Blé Goudé réagit,” 16 January 
2017; Connection Ivoirienne, “La Fidhop accuse le chef de l’état et exige de l’égalité 
dans les solutions,” 9 January 2017; The Guardian, “Shots Fired at Ivory Coast 
Army HQ after Mutineers’ Apology,” 12 May 2017; ICCO, “Daily Prices of 
Cocoa Beans, International Cocoa Organization,” 8 June 2017; Jeune Afrique, 
“Côte d’Ivoire: L’affaire de trop pour Guillaume Soro?,” 12 June 2017; Jeune 
Afrique, “Côte d’Ivoire: Les mutins présentent leurs excuses, des tirs entendus à 
Bouaké,” 8 June 2017; Koaci, “Côte d’Ivoire: Après la mutinerie, les soldats pas-
sent à la caisse Bouaké et retirent 5 millions de Fcfa,” 17 May 2017; L’Intelligent 
d’Abidjan, “Quand Ouattara défendait la cause des mutins,” 22 May 2017.  
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neers also felt they deserved to be rewarded for the central role they 
played in driving Gbagbo from power. Commentators noted the “cer-
tainty” of a government payout given that President Ouattara owed his 
accession to power to the current mutineers. In May 2017, these same 
soldiers again revolted when the government failed to adhere to the 
initial deal. This follows a common assumption that the military’s in-
volvement in settling political disputes inherently increases their willing-
ness to engage in future political meddling (e.g. Houngnikpo 2016). The 
theme of abused loyalty is apparent in at least two prior cases: In July 
2000, mutineers demanded bonuses for their participation in the coup 
that brought General Guéï to power. These soldiers were compensated 
for their assistance and returned to their barracks. And in November 
2014, soldiers who brought Ouattara to power demanded wage and 
bonus arrears. Following the same trend, the soldiers reached an agree-
ment with the government wherein they would be paid over the follow-
ing six months. They promptly returned to their barracks.  
Second, financial considerations were central to the mutinies of 
2017. Indeed, pay-related grievances are ubiquitous in the country’s mu-
tinies. Soldiers in 1990 and 1993 demanded extended employment con-
tracts, increased wages, and better living and working conditions. The 
1999 mutiny initially began with demands for peacekeeping bonuses, 
increased wages, and better living conditions. In 2002, troops protesting 
their demobilisation – and subsequent unemployment – revolted, 
plunging the country into civil war (El-Khawas and Anyu 2014). Later 
mutinies in 2008 were largely related to demobilisation payments, while 
2014 witnessed a mutiny by integrated soldiers demanding back pay. 
Though other grievances have been aired, pay has remained a recurring 
and pronounced theme, especially apparent in 2017. January’s mutiny 
saw a range of demands, including pay increases, bonuses, promotions, 
and better living conditions. February witnessed the Forces Spéciales 
become both disgruntled and emboldened by the government’s response 
to January’s mutineers, prompting similar financial demands. In May, 
January’s mutineers returned to the streets when subsequent payments 
promised in January went unfulfilled, despite ongoing efforts to improve 
housing and modernise the army.  
Third, it is imperative to understand the context in which the gov-
ernment is navigating these demands. After reporting significant economic 
growth in prior years, the economy experienced a shock when cocoa prices 
plummeted from over USD 3,100 per metric ton in June 2016 to USD 
2,250 by the start of the January mutiny. The drop continued following the 
original deal, hitting USD 2,000 on 7 June. This was not lost on Ouattara, 
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who pointed to a revenue loss of “nearly one billion euros.” Regarding 
payouts to the mutineers, he remarked that “Côte d’Ivoire can no longer 
bear the payment,” while Defence Minister Donwahi simply noted the 
coffers “are empty” (Kouassi 2017; Sylvestre-Treiner and Duhem 2017). 
Further putting the payouts in perspective is their individual scale, as sol-
diers are demanding a USD 19,000 payment in a country with a per capita 
GDP of USD 1,400. By comparison, the mutineers in 2000 received a 
reported USD 1,600 against the previous year’s GDP per capita of ap-
proximately USD 770 (World Bank 2017). 
Regardless of the fiscal realities of the state and the scale of the 
payout relative to the earnings of other Ivorians, the mutineers remained 
steadfast that the government could and should pay, with one mutineer 
claiming, “They are all billionaires with their big bellies and they want us 
to believe that there is no money” (Touré 2017). Meanwhile, civil serv-
ants repeatedly protested in January, demanding wage increases and 
pension reforms. This left the government with the decision of whom to 
pay: armed soldiers or civil servants? As one mutineer put it, “We’re not 
like teachers who express themselves with pens: our profession is guns” 
(Deutsche Welle 2017). Indeed, the May announcement of the end of the 
mutiny included other important revelations, specifically the cancellation 
of a variety of public projects, including the construction of schools and 
healthcare and cultural centres, and the delay of Ouattara’s plan to vastly 
expand access to electricity.  
Pay-related issues are a common grievance for soldiers around the 
globe, but mutinies are particularly common in countries still healing 
from the scars of war. Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique, for ex-
ample, each experienced numerous episodes of post-conflict military 
insubordination. These incidents also included both active and demobi-
lised elements of both state and rebel forces following their respective 
wars, in what have been described as “corporatist backlashes of post-
crisis situations in Africa” (Nyamsi 2017). However, the mutineers of 2017 
are notable in the scale of and commitment to their financial demands, 
especially against the state’s financial backdrop. These financial demands 
are perhaps unsurprising. McGovern (2011) presciently questioned the 
ability of the state to maintain its soldiers’ loyalty in the absence of war. 
The military’s involvement in a variety of industries, and especially the 
informal “roadblock economy,” was previously justified as a necessity of 
wartime (McGovern 2011: 166). The World Bank estimated that roadblock 
shakedowns run by soldiers and local militia cost the economy as much as 
USD 363 million annually, illustrating the financial stakes of instability 
(McGovern 2011: 185).  
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Finally, the mutinies raise serious concerns regarding the loyalty of 
armed forces. Some solace may be taken knowing that post-conflict 
countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique have weathered 
numerous mutinies without a resumption of large-scale hostilities. Fur-
ther, while regional coups against Bédié and Mali’s Amadou Toumani 
Touré highlight the potential for mutinies to escalate into power grabs, 
these are rare occurrences. However, the current regime is bruised, with 
loyalty guaranteed only so long as it can be purchased. This is readily 
acknowledged by the public, including many who see the payouts as 
covering “a private debt arising from a [...] contract between Ouattara 
[...] and his soldiers” (Abidjan.net 2017). Others have described the muti-
nies as extortion of the people by Ouattara’s “spoiled children” (Syddick 
2017). Yet others have suggested that demands would not end with sol-
diers, and would soon involve other groups, “from cocoa farmers to civil 
service [personnel]” (Bloomberg 2017). And while payouts may sometimes 
represent a reward for loyalty, commentators point to implications of the 
identity of mutineers, noting that “Ouattara was suspicious of the old 
elements of the defence and security forces, always labelled pro-Gbagbo, 
[… and] he has learned to his detriment to distrust also the former rebels 
who had supported him” (Sylvestre-Treiner and Duhem 2017).  
Recent events confirm that Ouattara has reason to be suspicious of 
those close to him. Speculation has been rampant that Guillaume Soro, 
former FN leader and current president of the National Assembly, was 
involved in organising the mutiny. Soro is under renewed scrutiny after a 
large cache of arms was discovered at a close relative’s home. The weap-
ons appear to have strengthened the resolve of the mutineers in May, 
just when they were under threat of intervention from loyalist security 
forces. While Soro’s role in recent mutinies has yet to be fully elucidated, 
the possibility of collusion with mutineers raises serious questions about 
the future stability of the country. Until Côte d’Ivoire finds a way to 
ensure that its soldiers remain loyal to the state instead of to its person-
alities, these questions will persist. 
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Meuterei in Côte d’Ivoire 
Zusammenfassung: Seit 1990 kam es in Côte d’Ivoire zu mehr als einem 
Dutzend Fällen von Aufruhr in der Armee; drei bedeutendere Einzelereig-
nisse waren in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres 2017 zu verzeichnen. Die Auto-
ren des Beitrags untersuchen die Hintergründe, indem sie sowohl das 
Geschehen im ersten Halbjahr 2017 betrachten als auch frühere Erfahrun-
gen des Staates mit Gehorsamsverweigerung von Militärs. Die Analyse der 
Ereignisse in Côte d’Ivoire im bislang turbulenten Jahr 2017 offenbart 
Parallelen zu früheren Meutereien, auch wenn die jüngsten Fälle wohl 
einzigartig sind, was die Breite der Dynamik und die Größenordnung der 
Forderungen angeht. Abgesehen von den fast immer vorgetragenen For-
derungen nach besserer Bezahlung offenbaren die jüngsten Meutereien 
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auch die generellen Gefahren für die zivil-militärischen Beziehungen in 
Nachkonfliktgesellschaften, wie die Herausforderungen der Demobilisie-
rung und der Integration bewaffneter Rebellen und die Risiken, die sich 
ergeben, wenn Soldaten zum Aufstieg von Führungspersönlichkeiten 
beigetragen haben beziehungsweise wenn die Loyalität von Soldaten Ein-
zelpersonen gilt und nicht dem Staat. 
Schlagwörter: Côte d’Ivoire, Nachkonfliktphase, Militär, Aufstand/Re-
volte, Militär und Gesellschaft 
